abstract: Many species of birds and insects engage in intraspecific brood parasitism (IBP), when a female lays eggs in the nest of a conspecific and leaves without providing parental care. These visiting females may also act to cooperate with a primary female, staying to provide parental care. Therefore, IBP and cooperative breeding can be considered extremes on a continuum of parental care provided by a secondary female. When a secondary female abandons a nest, she creates an asymmetry in parental care between herself and the host. While models of asymmetry in reproductive allocation have focused directly on relatedness between females, we lack an appropriate theoretical framework that addresses the effects of relatedness on parental care asymmetry. Here, I present an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) model that predicts the conditions under which IBP is favored over cooperation and solitary breeding. Intraspecific brood parasitism is less likely to evolve (relative to cooperation and solitary breeding) as the relatedness between a host and parasite increases. It can evolve, however, if parasites achieve a high overall fecundity relative to solitary females. Constraints on solitary breeding can further promote IBP under some circumstances. Cooperation is favored when relatedness is high and reproductive skew is low. This model makes several predictions regarding the conditions under which IBP may evolve, motivating a variety of experimental approaches.
Intraspecific brood parasitism (IBP) occurs when a female lays eggs in the nest of a conspecific and leaves without providing parental care. Cliff swallows are known to lay eggs in the nests of conspecifics (Brown 1984) , as are American coots (Lyon 1993a (Lyon , 1993b , with host females sustaining substantial costs through the reduction of clutch size and offspring survival. In waterfowl alone, there are * E-mail: raz4@cornell.edu.
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28 species exhibiting facultative IBP (Eadie et. al. 1988) , and over 20 species in which 120% of nests are parasitized per population (Rohwer and Freeman 1989) . Factors that may select for IBP in birds include higher fecundity, limitation on nesting sites, and reduced costs of parental care for parasitic females (Yom-Tov 1980) . Some insects also exhibit behaviors that are very similar to IBP in birds (Tallamy and Wood 1986; Brockmann 1993) . Female lace bugs (Tingidae) lay eggs in the egg masses of other females, enjoying a higher overall fecundity and fitness relative to primary females (Tallamy and Horton 1990) . In addition, many solitary wasps and bees lay eggs in the nests of conspecifics, reducing the costs of foraging and nest construction (Field 1992) .
In contrast to laying eggs parasitically, secondary females of some species can be found cooperating with the primary female, sharing both reproduction and parental care. Many putatively solitary insects such as membracids (Eberhard 1986 ), shield bugs (Mappes et. al. 1995) , and burying beetles (Eggert and Müller 1992; Scott 1994) can be found reproducing together under certain circumstances. In addition, about 3% of all bird species are considered cooperative breeders, often with some degree of reproductive asymmetry among females (Vehrencamp 1983; McRae 1996; Arnold and Owens 1998) . Recent adaptations of Hamilton's theory of inclusive fitness (1964) have used the idea of "reproductive skew" to make predictions about reproductive allocation among cooperatively breeding females (Vehrencamp 1983; Reeve and Ratnieks 1993; Keller and Reeve 1994) . Skew theory predicts that a dominant female will increasingly monopolize a colony's reproduction (high skew) with increasing relatedness between group members. As the relatedness between females decreases, under fixed ecological constraints, subordinates are given a larger fraction of the reproduction as a "staying incentive" to remain in the nest versus nesting independently (Emlen 1982; Vehrencamp 1983; Reeve 1991) . This prediction has been supported by recent empirical work (Reeve and Keller 1995; McRae 1996; Reeve et. al. 1998 ), but decisive tests are still few in number.
While reproductive allocation among cooperative breeders has received much attention, asymmetry in parental care has been given less theoretical treatment. Brood parasitism and cooperative breeding can be considered extremes on a continuum of parental care provided by secondary females that visit a nest. Just as the degree of reproductive skew is determined by the relatedness among cooperating females, we should expect inclusive fitness to affect the degree of parental care provided by a secondary female. Yet we lack an appropriate theoretical framework for predicting how a potential brood parasite will behave as a function of her relatedness to a primary female. After a secondary female has laid eggs, what are the factors that influence her decision to stay (cooperate) or to leave (parasitize)? One study by Emlen and Wrege (1986) found that parasitic females of the white-fronted bee-eater leave the nest after parasitizing if they are unrelated to host females but stay to help out if they are kin. Other researchers have suggested that kinship may actually facilitate the evolution of IBP (Andersson and Eriksson 1982; Andersson 1984; McRae and Burke 1996) . This prediction assumes that the costs of being parasitized are alleviated to some extent when a host shares many of her genes with the introduced eggs.
Here, I present an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) model of IBP that makes predictions about how relatedness affects the evolution of IBP versus cooperation and solitary breeding. Specifically, the model predicts that IBP will be less common as the relatedness between a host and a parasite increases. Intraspecific brood parasitism will be more common, however, as the costs of solitary breeding increase or the fecundity of a potential parasite increases.
Cooperative breeding is favored when there is equitable reproduction (low skew) or when relatedness is high. This model generates testable predictions regarding the conditions under which we should expect to see the evolution of IBP and cooperative breeding.
The Model
Consider a secondary female that arrives at the nest of a primary female during the host's egg-laying period. This female has three distinct options: lay eggs in the primary female's nest and leave (parasitism), lay eggs and remain at nest (cooperation), or found a nest of her own. I assume that primary nests are already established and are not a limiting resource. I also assume that the behavior of primary females is fixed in that they remain at the nest and do not eject parasites. Appendix A considers the situation in which primary females control secondary females' access to nests.
Parasitism during Host Egg Laying
Many species of birds and insects are known to displace a host's eggs during a parasitic event. In American coots, 54% of parasitic eggs are laid during the host's egg-laying period (Lyon 1993b) , and hosts respond by reducing their clutch size (Lyon 1998) . Female burying beetles that are parasitized rear the same number of offspring as unparasitized females, thus raising fewer of their own offspring (Müller et. al. 1990 ). Other birds and solitary Hymenoptera actually remove host eggs when laying parasitic ones (Eickwort 1975; Brown 1984; Field 1992) . In this model I assume that a host clutch is reduced by the exact number of parasitic eggs that are laid in the nest and that host eggs are not reduced when eggs are laid by a cooperator. Female fitness is defined as the number of offspring reared to maturity. The variables used in this model are described in table 1. The parameter represents the dev creased probability that a secondary female will successfully establish a nest after parasitizing (as a result of late breeding or inferior nest sites). The parameter s represents the benefit for broods of cooperating females relative to Hamilton's inequality (1964) :
c Here, the first term on the right-hand side of each equation represents personal fitness, which is the payoff to secondary females that results from each form of behavior. These terms correspond with the first row of the payoff matrix in table 2. The second term in each equation represents the kin component of inclusive fitness, which is the personal fitness for relatives affected by the behavior multiplied by the number of relatives involved (n) and the relatedness between females (r). These terms correspond with the second row of the payoff matrix in table 2. Specifically, r is the coefficient of genetic relatedness between primary and secondary females. For example, sisters or mother-daughters would be related by 0.5, first cousins by 0.125, and so on. All three equations describe the n kin that are affected by each behavior. This is why W s and W c retain effects on unparasitized kin, which are positively affected by the secondary female's decision not to parasitize them. It is important to note that equations (1)- (3) do not allow for multiple parasitisms, in that resident females enjoy an initial full clutch of size P. It is possible, however, to adapt these equations to incorporate more than one parasitism event per nest. This is the subject of appendix B, where I allow for multiple parasitisms as well as unequal parasitism rates for parasitized and unparasitized nests.
It is now possible to examine the inclusive fitness of each strategy relative to the other strategies. For example, what is the inclusive fitness payoff for solitary nesting versus parasitism? By setting up an inequality with (1) and (2), we can solve for r to get the following condition under which :
If the right side of (4) is between 0 and 1, it marks the transition from a parasitic strategy to a solitary strategy as relatedness between females increases. I assume that (which must be true for the solitary strategy to P 1 vX occur) and that (which must be true for the nK 1 P Ϫ vX parasitic strategy to occur). By taking the partial derivative of r with respect to each variable, under these conditions, it is clear that increasing X, K, , or n causes parasitism v to be more favorable. Increasing P, on the other hand, makes parasitism less favorable relative to solitary breeding. The transition from a parasitic to a solitary strategy can be seen in figure 1. At the transition value of r described in (4), the fitness values of W p and W s are exactly equal, while values of r below or above the quantity expressed in (4) favor a single strategy. This is the case for all of the remaining fitness inequalities that are presented in this article. Some readers may find it surprising that increased constraints on solitary breeding (lower ) will reduce parav sitism. Indeed, previous hypotheses of IBP have assumed that parasitic females are less successful at solitary breeding (Yom-Tov 1980) . This hypothesis seems to apply to some species of birds such as lesser snow geese (Lank et. al. 1989 ) and cavity nesters (Eadie et. al. 1998 ). In this model, however, I have assumed that a secondary female that chooses the solitary strategy will enjoy the same success as a primary female (clutch size of P as seen in eq. [1]). It is possible to assume that the secondary female will encounter the same difficulties while nesting solitarily that she would encounter when nesting as a parasite. This approach is justified if secondary females are of lower quality, less experienced, or late in arriving to the breeding site. In this case, equation (1) can be adapted so that the secondary female's solitary clutch of P is multiplied by the probability of nesting as a parasite ( ). This changes equav tion (4) such that the value P is replaced by . We would vP then expect parasitism to increase as constraints on solitary nesting increase ( decreases), provided that . Conv P 1 X straints on solitary nesting can therefore promote para- sitism in secondary females, while constraints on parasite nesting can reduce parasitism. I will, however, retain the original form of (1) we get the following condition under which cooperation is favored over parasitism:
If the right hand of (5) is between 0 and 1, it marks the transition from a parasitic strategy to a cooperative strategy as relatedness increases. I assume that (in vX ϩ nK 1 Rs order for parasitism to occur) and that P(s Ϫ 1) 1 vX Ϫ (in order for cooperation to occur). The partial derivRs atives of (5) with respect to each variable reveal that, under these conditions, cooperation becomes more favorable as P and R increase. Parasitism is more favored as , n, K, v and X increase. Increasing s will make cooperation more favorable if or less favorable if the
reverse inequality is true. The transition from parasitism to cooperation can be seen in figure 2. We can use equation (5) to make predictions about the threshold level of relatedness that is needed for a secondary female to remain at the nest and cooperate versus leave (and parasitize). Consider the situation in which a secondary female has laid K eggs in the nest of a primary female and K equals R (the number of eggs laid by a secondary cooperator). The threshold value of relatedness needed to keep the secondary female at the nest is shown in figure 3 , in which values of r above the curve predict that the secondary female will stay and cooperate. Allowing R and K to vary independently generates a three-dimensional version of this graph (fig. 4) for r we get the following condition:
It is clear from (6) that cooperation is more favorable as relatedness between females increases. Here, I assume that (otherwise cooperation is always favored). Under P 1 Rs these conditions, cooperation is more favorable as P decreases or R increases. Cooperation is also more favorable as s increases if (which must be the case because we P 1 R assume that and ). The value of r marking the P 1 Rs s 1 1 transition from solitary nesting to cooperation (eq. [6]) is shown in figure 5 .
When cooperation occurs, R/P is a ratio of the reproductive output of the secondary female relative to the primary female. This value of R/P can be viewed as a measure of the reproductive skew. When reproductive skew is high (primary female lays the majority of the eggs), P is much larger than R. When reproductive skew is low (each female lays a significant fraction of the eggs), P is not as large relative to R. Equation (6) shows that reproductive skew must be low (R/P large) for cooperation to occur at low levels of relatedness (r). Rearranging (6) and solving for 
This result is consistent with the predictions of skew theory in that a secondary female should stay to cooperate, even when reproductive skew is high, if she is highly related to the primary female (Reeve and Ratnieks 1993) . The value of R/P in (7) is analogous to the "staying incentive" of the traditional skew model, in which a dominant (primary) female gives up just enough reproduction to keep the subordinate (secondary) female from leaving the nest. In this case, we would expect the primary female to allow R to increase (or P to decrease) until the minimum value of R/P that satisfies (7) is achieved. In each of the cases covered in this model, an increase in relatedness among interacting females facilitates a transition from parasitism to cooperation, parasitism to solitary breeding, or solitary breeding to cooperation. The forms of the equations confirm that these transitions are unidirectional, as the denominators of equations (4)- (6) are always positive. Therefore, transitions of optimal strategies over reasonable values of relatedness can occur in a limited number of ways: parasitism to solitary breeding ( fig. 1 ), parasitism to cooperation ( fig. 2) , or solitary breeding to cooperation (fig. 5) . The fourth possibility is that a combination of all of these transitions will occur ( fig. 6 ). A combination of (4) and (5) describes the conditions under which this should occur:
Under these conditions we might expect to find populations exhibiting all three behaviors, depending on the degree of relatedness between females. For a given average r among females in a population, there is always a best strategy ( fig. 6 ), but a population may exhibit all three behaviors depending on the particular degree of relatedness between a pair of interacting females.
Parasitism after Host Egg Laying
In some birds, parasitic females will lay eggs after the primary female has laid her clutch (Lyon 1993b) . In addition, IBP in herbivorous insects does not seem to affect the clutch size of a host (Eberhard 1986; Tallamy and Horton 1990) . While each of these cases allows the primary female to lay an entire clutch, they have the potential to reduce the survival of the newly enlarged clutch by spreading resources over a greater number of offspring. The fitness function of a parasite of this type can be defined as
a where q equals the reduction in survival because of brood expansion or . Eggs laid by a parasite after the P/(P ϩ K ) host's egg laying spread the resources for the original clutch (P) over the newly expanded clutch ( ). This P ϩ K could represent food provisioning for birds or parental care and defense in subsocial herbivores.
It is then interesting to see which of the two parasitic strategies yields a higher overall fitness. Comparing (2) and (9) solitary to cooperative strategies with increasing relatedness between interacting females. Here, P = 17, K = 6, n = 2, X = 8, R = 7, s = 1.8, and = 0.8.
Substituting for q gives us , which is always P/(P ϩ K ) 11 r true, and therefore W p is always greater than W a . We can combine (1) and (9) to get the conditions under which :
Here, we must assume that P ϩ nP(1 Ϫ q) 1 nKq ϩ vX 1 for both solitary breeding and parasitism to occur. It is P clear that an increase in r or P facilitates the transition from W a to W s . Taking the partial derivative of (11) with respect to each variable reveals that an increase , n, K, or v X has the opposite effect, making parasitism more likely. Parasitism is less likely as q decreases if , a nK ϩ vX 1 P condition that will always be satisfied (assuming that and ). Appendix C considers the spe- (3) and (9) reveals the conditions under which :
Here, we can see that an increase in r or P facilitates the transition from W a to W c , while increasing K, , or X has v the opposite effect of making parasitism more likely. The partial derivative of (12) with respect to s reveals that cooperation is more likely as s increases if nKq ϩ vX 1 .
Parasitism is less likely as q decreases if
. Increasing n will always make vX ϩ K(n ϩ s Ϫ 1) 1 Rs parasitism more likely if .
Rs 1 vX
There is some evidence that the survivorship of parasitic eggs is inherently lower than the survivorship of host eggs. Studies of American coots have revealed that eggs laid parasitically had one-fourth the survival rate of eggs laid in a parasite's own nest, as a result of egg rejection and hatching failure (Lyon 1993a) . Including differential survival of host and parasite eggs does not change the qualitative results of the model. In both (4) and (5), the factor of nK in the numerator can be multiplied by u/o, where u is the intrinsic rate of survival for parasite eggs and o is the intrinsic rate of survival for host eggs. For parasitic eggs that are laid after the host's laying period, we can multiply the factor of nKq in (11) and (12) (Yom-Tov 1980; Lyon 1993a) . However, if secondary females only experience reduced nesting success when adopting the parasitic strategy (see eq. [2]), then a lower value of will actually promote the solitary v strategy. Females are also more likely to act as parasites if they are able to lay a higher number of total eggs through parasitism. Female membracids that lay eggs parasitically do actually have more eggs in their ovaries than their hosts (Eberhard 1984) . Studies of birds have revealed that parasites often lay more total eggs than nonparasitic females because they can lay eggs in other nests in addition to nesting solitarily (Lyon 1993a) . For these parasites, however, solitary nesting usually occurs after they have laid eggs in the nests of other females. For example, in American coots, 84% of parasitic eggs were laid before a parasite initiated her own nest (Lyon 1993b) .
Prediction 2
When there is IBP, females that parasitize should be less related to their hosts than cooperating or solitary females taken at random from the population. This result has been seen in Emlen and Wrege's study (1986) , where brood parasites were less related to their hosts than cooperating females. This prediction can be addressed with detailed field experiments coupled with physical or genetic markers denoting relatedness. In many ways, it is the most interesting and unexpected prediction of the model, contradicting previous speculations that brood parasites will be more related to their hosts than individuals chosen at random (Andersson and Eriksson 1982; Andersson 1984; McRae and Burke 1996) . Similar to the skew model predictions, the result is somewhat counterintuitive but can be explained by the inclusive fitness of the secondary female. This result also suggests that relatedness between parent and young directly influences parental investment, similar to the optimization models of Winkler (1987) and Westneat and Sherman (1993) .
Prediction 3
Cooperative breeding is more likely to occur when secondary females significantly contribute to the reproductive output of the nest (low skew) or when relatedness between females is high. As seen in equation (5), constraints on solitary breeding can facilitate cooperative breeding. Indeed, if is low v enough, a shift from IBP to cooperative breeding depends on a large reproductive output of the secondary female (R) relative to the host (P). A secondary female may abandon a nest (parasitize) if she is unable to lay many eggs but will stay if her output is closer to that of the primary female. Primary females might then allow a secondary female to reproduce in order to entice her to remain at the nest. This is analogous to the "staying incentive" described in models of reproductive skew. Equation (7) predicts that a secondary female will choose to cooperate, even when her reproductive contribution is low, if she is highly related to the primary female. This result is similar to skew theory models and experiments showing that reproductive skew increases with relatedness between dominant and subordinate females (Reeve and Ratnieks 1993; McRae 1996; Reeve et. al. 1998) .
Conclusions
These results indicate that relatedness has the potential to affect the evolution and occurrence of IBP. If this is the case, we might also expect to see the evolution of kin recognition in parasites and hosts (Hamilton 1987) . The evolution of egg recognition by hosts would both increase the success of host offspring and hinder the evolution of IBP (Yamauchi 1993) . Further tests of the above predictions could be addressed with the techniques of molecular genetics, allowing researchers to estimate relatedness between hosts and parasites (McRae and Burke 1996) . In mixed broods, K, R, and P could be estimated with DNA markers or fingerprinting. It is my hope that the predictions of the model presented here will stimulate further research into the effects of relatedness on the evolution of intraspecific brood parasitism.
The main prediction of this model, that IBP is less likely to evolve as the relatedness between host and parasite increases, may seem counterintuitive to some readers. The paradoxical nature of this result is reminiscent of the predictions of skew theory, in which increasing relatedness between cooperating females results in greater monopolization of reproduction by the dominant female (higher skew; Reeve and Ratnieks 1993) . Both approaches highlight the usefulness of mathematical models for generating predictions that challenge common assumptions. Future models of reproductive allocation that address variation in parental investment will continue to enhance our understanding of the evolution of intraspecific brood parasitism and cooperative breeding.
The first term in the right-hand side of (A1) and (A2) describes the personal component of a primary female's inclusive fitness, while the second term describes the kin component (r times the payoff for the secondary female). The terms in (A1) are taken directly from table 2. The kin component of inclusive fitness in (A2) assumes that the secondary female can lay the K eggs (that she does not lay because of rejection) in her solitary nest.
By combining (A1) and (A2), we get the condition under which :
When the initial assumption that is retained, it is
clear that under no circumstances will a primary female allow a secondary female to parasitize the nest. The result is the same if we consider the case in which the secondary female lays parasitic eggs after the primary female has laid her full clutch. This suggests that parasitism exists in nature because a resident is unable to defend the nest. The widespread absence of defense mechanisms in hosts remains a mystery but could be explained by negative tradeoffs (e.g., rejection of potential cooperators or less time spent foraging), evolutionary time lags, or phylogenetic constraint.
Ability of Primary Females to Repel Cooperating Secondary Females
When does a primary female decide to invite (W i ) or reject (W r ) a secondary cooperator? The inclusive fitness functions are as follows:
r Equations (A4) and (A5) can be used to generate the following inequality describing the conditions under which :
Here, it is assumed, as in (6), that (otherwise the P 1 Rs primary female will always invite a secondary cooperator). A closer examination of (A6), by taking partial derivatives with respect to r, reveals that the primary female is more likely to accept a cooperator as P decreases and as R increases. Cooperation is more likely as s increases if P 1 , which must be true because and (this is R P 1 Rs s 1 1 the same condition found in eq. [6]). Surprisingly, under these same conditions, a primary female is less likely to invite a secondary cooperator as r increases. This is because the kin component of her inclusive fitness is greater when her kin nest solitarily.
Combining (6) and (A6) reveals the conditions under which both a primary female accepts a cooperating secondary female and a secondary female decides to remain and cooperate:
If then we should expect cooperation (over solitary m ! 1 breeding) when equation (6) is satisfied. If, however, and , we would expect to see a primary female m 1 1 1/m 1 r invite a secondary female into the nest, with the secondary female choosing solitary nesting instead (i.e., eq. [6] is not satisfied).
APPENDIX B Multiple Parasitism in Host Nests
Equations (1)-(3) describe primary females that have not yet experienced parasitism, in that they start with a full clutch of size P. It is possible to adapt these equations to incorporate more than one parasitism event per nest. For example, we can change (1)-(3) so that the size of every host brood is reduced by an additional K with probability b. In this case, I assume that all nests have the same probability of being parasitized. We then get the following series of equations: 
A comparison of (B5) and (5) reveals that multiple parasitism makes cooperative breeding less favorable relative to parasitism.
What if the probability of multiple parasitism is not the same for all nests? It is easy to imagine that parasites prefer to lay eggs in unparasitized nests, such that parasitized nests are less likely to get parasitized a second time. Equations (B1)-(B3) can be expanded to incorporate parasitism probabilities that are unique to each type of nest: Here, b s is the probability that a solitary nest will get parasitized, b p is the probability that a parasitized nest will get parasitized, and b c is the probability that a cooperating nest will get parasitized. asitism is less likely.
APPENDIX C Parasitism Has Zero Cost (or Is Beneficial) to Host
There may be some instances in which enlarging a host brood through parasitism has no harmful effect on the survival of the brood. For example, in some precocial species, in which parental care is less important, the costs of parasitism may be negligible for the host. Here, I assume that clutch size is not reduced when parasitic eggs are laid as there is no reason for a resident to adjust the size of a clutch. It is possible to adapt (11) under the condition to get the following expression for : q = 1 W 1 W s a P 1 nK ϩ vX.
( C 1 )
In other words, the kin component of inclusive fitness drops out entirely, and a female will behave such that her fecundity (total egg number) is maximized. We can also imagine a situation in which parasitism increases the survival of a nest or a brood. There is some evidence that lace bugs laying parasitic eggs on the edges of host egg masses provide a buffer from predators that can increase the overall survival of host eggs (Tallamy and Horton 1990) . In ant-tended herbivores, larger groups of nymphs enjoy a higher level of protection from predators (McEvoy 1979) . This sort of facilitation may occur in some circumstances, and it changes equation (11) In other words, we should expect to see secondary females prefer to "parasitize" the nests of close relatives. As r increases, we expect to find that parasitism is more likely relative to solitary breeding. I consider this to be a special case in which the augmentation of a brood will increase the overall survival of that brood.
